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The Political Economy of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Governance System1  
 
Abstract: 
In spite of the exponentially increasing volume of the CDM system of the Kyoto Protocol, very few 
have so far come up with scholarly political economy analysis of its governance system. Based on 
interviews with the CDM system’s main stakeholders as well as through scrutiny of CDM related 
documents, this paper will contribute to filling this hole. In this respect, it is assumed that the 
political economy analysis can be based on two analytical concepts: First, the CDM governance 
system has to be legitimate (the political side of the system), i.e. seen as broadly acceptable and 
accountable by its stakeholders as well as the broader public. Second, the CDM governance system 
has to be efficient (the economic side of the system), i.e. involve as few transaction costs as 
possible. Based on these concepts, the paper analyses the present balances of the CDM governance 
system.  
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1.  Introduction  
How does the system of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) function in political economy 
terms? In order to analyse the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) system, this paper will utilise 
the overarching concept of governance. Hence, the paper will not (as is often the case2) evaluate the 
CDM system with regard to its contribution to environmental, social, and economic sustainability. 
Neither will I explicitly analyse the potential impact on the developing countries (see instead Del 
Rio 2007; Cosbey et al. 2005; Sugiyama et al. 2005). Instead, it will analyse the CDM system in 
general and the multiple functions of the Executive Board of the CDM system in particular due to 
the fact that this institution seems to be quintessential to the governance structure of the CDM.  
 
It is assumed that the analysis of this paper can be based primarily on two analytical concepts: first, 
the CDM governance system has to be legitimate, i.e. seen as broadly acceptable and accountable 
by its stakeholders as well as the broader public, and second the CDM governance system has to be 
efficient, i.e. involve as few resources or transaction costs as possible.3 In spite of criticism, the 
CDM system has also been acknowledged as an original innovation of the Kyoto Protocol (Matsuo 
2003; Lesolle 2008). However, no matter what, the CDM system is in itself an experiment in 
international governance without the strong backup of states. As such it is an interesting societal 
phenomenon that could contribute to our general understanding of the scopes and limits of mainly 
non-state based international governance. 
 
There is a line of literature evaluating whether or not the CDM system should be abolished 
altogether or not (e.g. Del Rio 2007; Michaelowa and Joko 2005). It is not the aim of this paper to 
contribute to this literature. Instead, the CDM system is taken for granted as an example of how to 
promote international governance through mainly private actors. 
 
In fact, CDM has shown itself to be an important tool in order to create a dynamic market for 
reduction of GHG emissions. From 2005 onwards more than 5000 projects have been included in 
the pipeline of the CDM governance system. It is estimated (in 2010) that by 2012 the CDM 
                                                
2 See, for example, Olsen (2007); Lesolle (2008), and Murphy et al. (2008). 
3 One could claim that if the CDM governance system is both legitimate and efficient it is also effective, i.e. able to 
achieve the set of goals that its founders have set for it. 
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governance system will have contributed to a reduction of 2.9 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide 
equivalents (CDM Statistics 2010).  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the institutions of CDM, in Section 3 the 
conceptual framework of the paper is presented, and in Section 4 and Section 5 this framework is 
exploited in the analysis of the CDM governance system. Section 6 entails the conclusion. 
  
 
2.  Institutions of CDM 
The CDM is set up by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol under the UN Framework Convention of 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a compromise between developed and developing countries 
(Matsuo 2003).4 The CDM mechanism is based upon development of project activities in 
developing countries that result in real, measurable, and long term benefiting emission reductions, 
which are to be additional to any activity that would occur in the absence of the project activity. 
Emission reductions are certified and subsequently transformed into tradable carbon credits (the so-
called CERs – Certified Emission Reductions). 
 
The CDM is subject to the authority and guidance by the conference of Kyoto Parties (called CMP 
– Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol). However, 
the CDM mechanism is mainly ‘supervised’ by an Executive Board. Projects are registered and 
credits are issued by the Executive Board on the basis of validation and verification reports 
respectively, which are elaborated by independent ‘Designated Operational Entities’ (DOEs), 
especially accredited by the Executive Board (and confirmed by CMP) for that purpose.5 According 
to Article 12 (paragraph 9) participation in the CDM may explicitly involve private and/or public 
entities. Each Party (i.e. country) involved in project activities shall approve its voluntary 
participation. By definition the host country of the project activity will always be involved (Lee 
2004).  
 
                                                
4 Decision 1/CP.3: Adoption of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
December 1997 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf) 
5 The crediting period is either 7 years with the possibility of renewing this period two times or a maximum of 10 years. 
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In Marrakech in 2001, the Conference of the Parties adopted a set of Modalities and Procedures 
(M&Ps)6 with the aim of ‘ensuring transparency, efficiency and accountability,’ according to Kyoto 
Article 12. The M&Ps constituted the Executive Board7 and were the starting point of the 
implementation of the CDM.8 
 
Countries participating in CDM activities have to set up a government authority (called by its 
acronym: DNA – Designated National Authority), which declares the country’s voluntary 
participation in a letter of approval (short: LoA).9 According to the M&Ps, the objective of assisting 
in achieving sustainable development is the prerogative of the (developing) host country and 
consequently has to be confirmed in the letter of approval by that country.10 
 
As mentioned, the condition - which generated emission reductions - has to be real, measurable, 
verifiable and additional. This is the foremost purpose of the CDM system set up to achieve and 
safeguard this goal pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol and in line with the mandate given by the CMP 
(see Section 4 below). 
 
The condition mentioned above is implemented in the M&Ps requiring each project to be based 
upon a baseline and monitoring methodology. Basically, the baseline is the situation without the 
project, and the achieved reductions are the baseline emissions minus the project emissions. The 
methodologies shall be approved beforehand by the Executive Board.11  
 
Projects are registered and CERs are issued automatically on the basis of reports submitted by 
DOEs after a certain time span, unless three members of the Executive Board or a Party involved 
                                                
6 Decision 17/CP.7 contained in FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a02.pdf#page=2) as 
confirmed by decision 3/CMP.1 contained in FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 
(http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a01.pdf#page=6) 
 
7 M&Ps section C. “Executive Board”. 
8 Decision 17/CP7 paragraph 1 (prompt start). 
9 M&Ps section F. Participation  requirements. 
10 Fundamentally, the aim of this letter is to safeguard the legitimacy of the CDM project in the host country. There are 
no specific provisions about how to safeguard project activities assistance in achieving developing countries 
contribution to the ultimate objective of the convention. This objective therefore might be seen simply as a spin off of 
the development of climate friendly projects.  
 
11 M&Ps paragraph 38. 
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requests a review, in which case the Executive Board decides whether to register/issue or to 
undertake a review. In the latter case, the Executive Board will decide upon the case in the 
following meeting on the basis of findings of a review team composed by Executive Board 
members.12 
 
 
 
3. A framework for the analysis of CDM governance 
As mentioned in the introduction, in order to analyse the CDM system, this paper will utilise the 
overarching concept of governance. In the literature, there are a large number of definitions of this 
concept, however, the World Bank broadly defines governance as ‘the exercise of political authority 
and the use of institutional resources to manage society’s problems and affairs’.13 More specifically, 
governance relates to decisions that define expectations, grant power, or verify performance. In the 
following, this paper will use this definition. 
 
The CDM is a governance instrument allowing Annex I (industrialised) countries to invest in 
projects that reduce emission in Non-Annex I (developing) countries as an alternative to more 
expensive projects in their own countries. Hence, the mechanism makes more cost-effective 
emission reduction projects possible simply because emission reduction projects in developing 
countries are often easier and cheaper than projects with an equal effect in industrialised countries. 
The argument is that industry and other activities that cause emission in developing countries are 
often less technologically developed and less energy efficient than industry in industrialised 
countries.  
 
As also mentioned in the introduction, it is assumed that that governance rely on aspects covered by 
legitimacy and efficiency where “legitimacy” covers the political aspects of CDM governance and 
“efficiency” covers the economic aspects of CDM governance. The literature on international 
political economy often stresses the dilemmas and (sometimes) trade-offs between legitimacy and 
efficiency as far as international governance is concerned (see, e.g., Cottarelli 2002; Page 2002; 
                                                
12 M&Ps section G. Validation and registration and I. Verification and certification. 
13 World Bank 1991. ‘Managing Development – The Governance Dimension.’ Washington D.C. 
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Depledge 2005). This paper will follow up on that literature and take it to an area of extreme 
difficult governance conditions due to the lack of a strong backing of states, namely that of CDM 
governance. 
 
In the CDM governance system, successful projects are awarded with positive consequences in the 
shape of CERs according to the achieved emission reduction during the crediting period. Each unit 
represents the reduction in emission of one tonne of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and thus 
permission to emit the same amount elsewhere. Furthermore, CERs are tradable on a global market 
allowing projects to sell CERs to highest bidder.  
 
Clearly, this type of mechanism requires supervision, coordination, and development in order to be 
considered legitimate. This is attempted to be provided for by the organisational structure of the 
CDM. The CMP has given the Executive Board a key role mandating it to exercise both legislative, 
executive, and in a certain sense, judiciary power since the Executive Board has the prerogative of 
reviewing and taking final decisions on cases submitted for registration or issuance after final 
validation/verification by a DOE (Leuget and Elabed 2008). 
 
In his classical seminal book on political systems, David Easton (1965) defined legitimacy as an 
essential input that the specific political community granted to a political order. The system is 
sustainable only as far as the community endorses a certain degree of legitimacy belief. 
 
Input legitimacy is the legitimacy created for the political system through various representative 
procedures. Output legitimacy, on the other hand, is based on the political system’s deliverance of 
public goods like, for example, an atmosphere with – ceteris paribus – less GHGs.  
 
Efficiency, on the other hand, is related to the cost of running the CDM governance system which 
involves transactions costs. In other words, the fewer transaction costs, the more efficient the 
governance system is. In a global perspective, according to the Stern Report (2006), global warming 
is the biggest market failure for human civilisation so far. At the same time, when following 
Kenneth Arrow’s (1969) observation that ‘market failure is not absolute; it is better to consider a 
broader category, that of transaction costs, which in general impede and in particular cases block 
the formations of markets’, we are led to the concept of transaction costs. 
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According to Williamson (1985: 1), a transaction ‘occurs when a good or a service is transferred 
across a technologically separable interface.’ In other words, transactions are equivalent to frictions 
in the physical system. 
 
Ronald Coase’s famous article (1960) points out that if transaction costs can be reduced to zero, 
decentralised market outcomes will be efficient or Pareto optimal. However, transaction costs are 
unavoidable. Markets cannot function without institutions that – at a minimum – enforce contracts, 
disseminate information, and resolve disputes. In other words, governance is needed. 
 
As far as the CDM governance system is concerned, as Michaelowa and Jotzo (2005) have pointed 
out, transaction costs of the CDM system strongly depend on the institutional framework. 
Transaction costs will be higher in countries with an efficient regulatory framework and will lead to 
a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis other countries (Michaelowa and Jotzo 2005: 512). In other 
words, the key to increased efficiency of the CDM governance system is to design the adequate 
institutional framework. In this respect, all institutions of the CDM governance system might be 
important even though the Executive Board’s role is paramount. 
 
Each step in the process adds costs that do nothing to remove additional GHGs, but are essential to 
ensure that CERs on the market have scientific credibility and are, thereby, legitimate to project 
host countries. In the theory, ex ante costs are described as the costs of drafting, negotiating, and 
safeguarding an agreement (Williamson 1985: 20). In this respect, safeguards can sometimes be 
fashioned to signal so called credible commitments.  
 
Ex post costs of contracting takes several forms. ‘These include (1) the mal 
adaption costs incurred when transactions drifts out of alignments’ […] ‘(2) the haggling costs 
incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post misalignments, (3) the set up and running 
costs associated with the governance structures (often not the courts) to which disputes are referred, 
and (4) the bonding costs of effecting secure commitments’ (Williamson 1985: 20). 
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An elaborate project cycle may increase up-front transaction costs but reduce them ex post. Hence, 
rules that also enhance transparency will be crucial to reduce search costs, even if they entail ex 
ante costs. 
 
Economies of scale are the most important determinant for the share of transaction costs in total 
costs. In Michaelowa and Jotzo (2005: 514), estimates for transaction costs were 0.1 euro/t for large 
projects, 0.9 euro/t for wind projects, 75 euro/t for smaller projects and 750 euro/t for very small 
projects. 
 
The study of economising transaction costs also entails an examination of alternative ways to 
govern exchange interfaces. Again, according to Williamson (1985: 129), in general terms 
governance occurs in three broad ways: (1) through top-down methods that primarily involve 
governments and the state bureaucracy, i.e. through hierarchies; (2) through the use of market 
mechanisms whereby market principles of competition serve to allocate resources while operating 
under government regulation; and (3) through networks involving, for example, public-private 
partnership or with collaboration of community organisations, i.e. mixed modes of governance. 
Clearly, the CDM governance system is a mixed mode of governance involving both private and 
public actors.  
 
CDM transaction costs are especially important because the financial sustainability of CDM 
projects is so closely linked to the size of the CER revenue stream. In general, transaction costs 
involved in the CDM governance system are components in the price of a CER that cannot be 
attributed to either: 1) the physical process of removing GHGs from the atmosphere; or 2) the level 
(or changes in the level) of demand for CERs (Chadwick 2006). 
 
In order to function legitimately and efficiently, both in relation to its stakeholders and in relation to 
the wider international community, the CDM is dependent on a variety of incentives. They include 
environmental accountability and profitability from a business perspective, i.e. output legitimacy. 
Transparency is an overall requirement in terms of legitimising the system to the outside world (i.e. 
input legitimacy).  
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On the basis of the concepts introduced in Section 3, now follows an analysis of the CDM 
governance system focusing on the CMP, the Executive Board, and the DOEs. 
 
 
4. Analysing the CDM governance system 
The CMP 
The CMP is formally the supreme authority of the CDM governance system setting out the 
regulatory framework conditions in the form of the M&Ps and subsequent decisions. The CMP has 
established the political needs and desired outcomes of the CDM governance system. Hence, it 
provides the CDM governance system with legitimacy as far as representation and legal bases are 
concerned. However, with a few exceptions like the formal designation, i.e. confirmation of the 
Executive Board’s accreditation of DOEs, the CMP is not supposed to take case-specific decisions. 
Unless explicitly stated, it cannot change case specific decisions by the Executive Board. However, 
as supreme body it can decide to take over matters which it has mandated to the Executive Board, 
such as specific methodological issues. In addition, the Executive Board can refer issues to the 
CMP for further guidance and decision-making. In general, the CMP can amend the Kyoto Protocol 
but cannot take decisions with effect for Parties outside the Protocol.  
 
CMP consists of 175 sovereign states working with a consensus decision-making process. The 
CMP, like all UN bodies, is traditionally divided into industrialised countries and developing 
countries (the so called Group of 77 plus China) in order to secure its legitimacy. The EU acts as 
a unitary actor. Other countries act more or less in concert in the UN regional groups and other 
groupings with particular interest in the issues (i.e. OPEC, Small Developing Island States, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa). These groups have different interests and priorities of how to pursue the issue 
of climate change, how to share the burden of actions and commitments (e.g. between industrialised 
and developing countries), how to promote capacity building, how to deal with adverse impact, etc.  
However, in order to safeguard the overall legitimacy of the CDM governance system, it is essential 
that all the actors mentioned are represented to a certain degree (Olsen and Fenhann 2008).  
 
The simplified existing governance system for registration of projects is as outlined below in Figure 
1. 
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Figure 1. The governance system for registration of projects 
 
Source: Compiled by Hans Jürgen Stehr and the author. 
 
 
The CMP guidance in recent years can be characterised as emphasising the need for consolidation. 
This seems to be reasonable in a phase where the CDM is continuing to grow exponentially and, 
thereby, continuously challenging its governance system. The priorities to consolidate by the CMP 
are illustrated by the general request to the Executive Board to continue to improve the efficient, 
cost-effective, transparent, and consistent functioning of the CDM by continuously keeping the 
management plan under review and adjustment. At the same time, the CMP encouraged all 
stakeholders, regulatory and private, to make every effort to contribute toward a more transparent, 
equitable, consistent, and predictable CDM system.14 
 
                                                
14 See the footnote above. 
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In short, the CMPs wish for consolidation sets a framework for initiatives that would strengthen the 
efficiency and legitimacy of the CDM governance system. With that political background what is 
attempted is an evolution that strengthens the implementation of these two concepts as far as the 
CDM governance system is concerned. 
 
The Executive Board  
However, the most important key to the governance with the CDM system is the Executive Board. 
It is super-ordinate within the framework given by the CMP in the M&Ps and subsequent decisions. 
The Executive Board is really a ‘non-executive governance board’. According to the mandate given 
by the CMP, the Executive Board with its support structure referred to below constitutes the 
centralised level of the governance system of the CDM. At the decentralised level, we find the 
DOEs and the Designated National Authorities (DNAs). The DOEs are needed to provide the 
technical expertise and the DNAs to ensure the support from member states’ governments. 
However, the Executive Board does not seem to have efficient means of enforcement or assurance.  
 
It is within this centralised and decentralised institutional framework that the private actors plays 
their role developing and implementing CDM projects, thus entering into the legal rights and 
obligations of the system. 
 
Besides its executive role, the Executive Board also has a regulatory as well as an executive role to 
play. As a regulatory body, the Executive Board adopts rules of substance as well as procedural 
rules.  
 
The first set of rules is the approved baseline and monitoring methodologies as the basic eligibility 
requirement. Guidance and clarifications of how methodologies should be understood are also 
perceived as de facto binding decision to be taken by the Executive Board. Methodological tools, 
such as the additionality tool, are not binding unless incorporated in a methodology, which will 
often be the case.15 Thus the Executive Board provides rules constituting what is and is not allowed 
and determines the legal position of a stakeholder (UNFCCC 2010).  
 
                                                
15 See below on the definition of the additionality concepts. 
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The latter consists of procedures for the approval and revision of methodologies, for accreditation, 
supervision, etc. of DOEs, for submission of requests for registration and issuance and for review of 
cases for registration and issuance and for administration of the CER registry.  
 
In general, the Executive Board provides procedural rules that govern participation in the 
administrative process, communication top-down and bottom-up, the decision-making process itself 
and any administrative review of decisions. 
 
As an executive body the Executive Board accredits DOEs; registers projects, including 
undertaking reviews and as appropriate rejecting registration; similarly it issues or rejects issuance 
of CERs; it manages the CER registry; and last but not least, it manages its own work, support 
structure, and budget through the Management Plan (MAP).16  Decisions by the Executive Board, 
e.g. on registration and issuance, are final in the sense that they cannot be challenged at another 
superior body.17 The raison d’etre of this is to safeguard its decision-making efficiency. 
 
The DOEs and project developers can address issues raised prior to the meeting following the 
request for review, at which time the Executive Board decides whether to register possibly with 
corrections or to proceed. In the latter case, the scope of the review is defined and a review team is 
set up. At the following meeting the Executive Board takes a final decision on the basis of a 
recommendation by the review team prepared by the Secretariat taking into account the response by 
the DOEs and project developers. The Executive Board can choose to register, to register with 
corrections or to reject registration.18 The procedures for review of a request for issuance follow 
mutatis mutandis the same line. In general, it appears as if the Executive Board is a strong 
                                                
16 Decisions 7/CMP.1 paragraphs 9-10 (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a01.pdf#page=93), decision 
1/CMP.2 paragraphs 6-10  (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2006/cmp2/eng/10a01.pdf#page=3) and decision 2/CMP.3 
paragraph 6  (http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cmp_guid_cdm.pdf)  (guidance by CMP1, 2 and 3 
respectively). The latest version (2008v1) of the MAP has been approved by the 37th meeting of the Executive Board 
30.1.-1.2.2008  ( http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/037/eb37_repan23.pdf ) 
17 However, upon the request of three members or a Party involved, the power to review cases for registration or 
issuance and subsequently decide upon these cases might in itself be compared to judiciary power or an appeal system 
since the subject is the validation or verification undertaken by the DOEs on behalf of the regulatory system.  
 
Requests for review of a submission for registration shall be related to issues associated with the validation 
requirements, and the review shall be finalised no later than at the second meeting following the request for review. 
 
18 See http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/COPMOP/08a01.pdf#page=54 
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hierarchical command and control regulator trying to run all the functions of the CDM governance 
system. This is also the governance method often recommended in order to minimise transaction 
costs (cf. Williamson 1985). However, this might be at the cost of the legitimacy side of the 
equation. 
 
The Executive Board is served by the UNFCCC Secretariat, which in turn is compensated through 
the CDM income. Before 2007, the Executive Board was dependent on voluntary contributions by 
Parties, in particular before the Kyoto Protocol came into force in early 2005. The UNFCCC core 
budget could not be used for implementation of the Protocol because of some UNFCCC Parties not 
wanting to be part of the Protocol. Under these conditions staff planning was difficult, therefore in 
the early years considerable work was provided by a very small staff (UNFCCC 2010).  
  
To accomplish its tasks, the Executive Board has set up several subcommittees or panels (presently 
Accreditation Panel, Methodologies Panel, Deforestation & Reforestation Working Group and 
Small-Scale Working Group) as well as a Registration and Issuance Team (short: RIT), which, 
through the Secretariat, assists Executive Board members to address validation and verification 
issues. Chair and vice-chair posts of expert panels and working groups are selected from the 
Executive Board in order to prepare for Executive Board decisions and to secure the decision-
making efficiency.  
 
The RIT was originally set up as a roster of experts assisting Executive Board members in their task 
to assess whether or not to request review of registration or issuance cases. After the full 
development of the Secretariat the role has changed and the RIT member now submits his or her 
report to the Secretariat that afterwards provides a briefing note to Executive Board members 
attaching the RIT member findings.19 
 
Together the Secretariat and the panels, working groups and the RIT make up the support structure 
of the Executive Board. It appears that the basic organisational structure of the Executive Board is 
safeguard an efficient governance structure.  
 
                                                
19 See Terms of reference and procedure for a registration and issuance team (RIT). 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Procedures/reg_proc02_v05_1.pdf  
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As far as membership is concerned, the Executive Board is composed of ten members and ten 
alternates, in practical terms working as a team of 20. Members (and likewise alternates) are elected 
in their personal capacity by the CMP for two-year terms with the possibility of re-election for a 
further term in the same function (as member or alternate). In order to promote the input legitimacy 
of the CDM governance system, candidates are nominated (one each) by the regional UN groups 
(Western European and Others, Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America plus Small Island 
Development States). Two more candidates are nominated by Annex I and two by Non-Annex I 
countries. Thus, of the ten members, six are from developing countries and four from developed 
countries. Chair and vice-chair are, according to the M&P, elected by the Executive Board itself for 
one-year terms altering Annex I and Non-Annex I representatives.20 Membership is unpaid.21 
 
In order to maximise transparency, and, thereby, increase input legitimacy, meetings of the 
Executive Board are broadcast directly on the World Wide Web unless the Executive Board deals 
with confidential matters, e.g. specific cases, and virtually all non-confidential documentation is 
publicly available. 
 
Since early 2007, the CDM has been de facto self-financing, mainly through shares of proceeds 
paid in as a registration fee variable to the expected level of CERs, giving the Executive Board full 
control of developing and implementing an appropriate support structure.22 In principle, this should 
contribute to its efficiency. 
 
The participation of the private sector (project developers, investors, etc.) is voluntary. In order to 
participate, the private actors have to adhere to the rules, and, via the DOEs, submit projects for 
registration at the Executive Board. 
 
There is no restriction to participate once the rules are met and all requirements are fulfilled. The 
participation will be negatively sanctioned if the private actor does not behave according to the 
rules, i.e. registration or issuance will be rejected. 
                                                
20 Cf. footnote 5. See in particular paragraphs 7- 12. 
21 Members/alternates are granted a daily subsistence allowance that is 40% more than the standard UN rate. Cf. 
decision 7/CMP 1 paragraph 17.  
22 However, the question of possible remuneration or compensation of Executive Board members besides the Daily 
Subsistence Allowance is considered the competence of the CMP as the body institutionalising the Executive Board.  
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The role in the system is limited to activities that are endorsed by the super-ordinate power 
(Executive Board and with allocated powers, the DOEs). In other words, the role given to private 
actors may first and foremost be interpreted as an attempt to enhance the efficiency of the system, 
i.e. reducing its transaction costs (UNFCCC 2010; Del Rio 2007).  
 
Even though the present organisational structure of the Executive Board seems to be efficient, the 
Executive Board has been criticised from various sides on the basis of legitimacy arguments. One 
type of criticism is that the Executive Board has taken up roles without a mandate. In other words: 
Are the roles already given to the Executive Board in accordance with governance the CDM system 
aimed at optimising the legitimacy of the system? However, according to the statement in the 2007 
IETA status of the CDM, the criticism that both the Executive Board and its Bodies deviated from 
the established structure and assumed responsibilities not assigned to them, resulting in decisions 
that are inconsistent and/or outside the mandate given, is not substantiated according to various 
interviewees. 
 
Secondly, another criticism concerns the lack of transparency and predictability when applications 
are accepted or not. According to this criticism there is a lack of systematic enquiry as to which 
projects are accepted by the Executive Board due to the fact that both sector affiliation and used 
methodology seems to be significant for the result (Leuget and Elabed 2008: 78). In effect, if this 
criticism is justified, it will certainly hurt both the legitimacy and the efficiency of the CDM 
governance. 
 
Thirdly, in addition, is has been questioned whether the Executive Board’s decisions depend on 
political considerations which would – is this was in fact the case – undermine the predictability of 
the CDM decision-making system, and, thereby, its legitimacy (Maosheng 2008: 103). 
 
All types of criticism mentioned above constitute the backdrop of the analysis of this paper of the 
legitimacy and efficiency of the CDM governance system. 
 
Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) 
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Accreditation is the formal recognition of competence given to qualified organisations, which are 
then granted the ability to validate (and/or verify/ certify) that the requirements of the system for 
which they are accredited are met. 
 
This function is within the CDM system mandated to the Designated Operational Entities (DOEs), 
which consequently are at the decentralised level of the regulatory system. Without inclusion of 
accredited DOEs, the relevant functions had to be taken by the Executive Board or a subsidiary 
body. By validating projects (via Project Design Documents – the PDDs) and verifying 
performance their role is to safeguard the output legitimacy of the system. Projects are 
automatically registered and CERs automatically issued on the basis of a DOE validation or 
verification unless three members of the Executive Board or a DNA requests a review (UNFCCC 
2010). 
 
There is no possibility of appeal against a positive or negative validation and/or verification 
elaborated by DOEs. However, as described above, a review by the Executive Board can ultimately 
lead to the rejection of the requested registration or issuance which means that the Executive Board 
has the right of undertaking a quasi appeal or judiciary role on its own initiative. 
 
The Executive Board accredits DOEs on the basis of procedures which have been developed by the 
Executive Board itself within the mandate of the M&Ps and which have been revised a number of 
times taking into account experience gained. In general, the procedures of accrediting DOEs appear 
to be sufficiently efficient to potentially secure the CDM governance system.  
 
The accreditation procedure contains three steps following a preliminary consideration by the 
Accreditation Panel (AP) of the file for application submitted by the applicant entity.23 First, a desk 
review is undertaken by the assessment team (AT) assigned by the AP and composed by an AP 
member and accreditation experts including secretariat staff. Secondly, an on-site assessment takes 
place by the AT on the premises of the applicant entity. And thirdly, a number of witnessing 
activities by the AT as requested by the AP to assess whether the applicant can perform validation 
and verification/issuance tasks as a DOE in the scope(s) of accreditation it has applied for. 
Accreditation for validation and verification/issuance respectively can be applied for and granted in 
                                                
23 Section III. B. 1-4 Accreditation procedures. 
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separate consecutive processes. The Accreditation Panel submits recommendations for the Boards 
decisions on the basis of the findings of the reporting of the ATs. The accreditation procedure can 
only be interpreted as a way to safeguard the legitimacy of the CDM governance system (cf. Lee 
2004: 46-49).  
 
The procedures contain as control measures, according to the M&Ps, the possibilities for Executive 
Board to do spot checks (unscheduled surveillance) of the performance of accredited DOEs.24 Spot 
checks can be triggered i.e. by requests for review of reports submitted by the DOE, information 
about changes affecting the quality or performance of the DOE or a written, substantiated complaint 
regarding the alleged failure of the DOE to comply with the requirements of its accreditation. A 
written complaint can be submitted by another DOE, an NGO accredited with UNFCCC, or a 
stakeholder which in accordance with paragraph 1(e) of the CDM M&P means the public, including 
individuals, groups or communities affected, or likely to be affected, by the proposed CDM project 
(Lee 2004: 40-49). 
 
Such spot checks have been undertaken in a few cases resulting in significant corrective actions by 
the DOEs involved. The proximity of spot checks is essential for the legitimacy of the CDM 
governance system as it is a way to safeguard that the projects involve the promised additional 
reductions of GHGs. 
 
In order to provide further confidence about the full implementation and effectiveness of the entire 
validation and verification system, the Executive Board has introduced a surveillance system 
according to which regular surveillance visits take place at least once during the three year crediting 
period comprising two days on-site assessments, supervised by the Accreditation Panel reporting to 
the Executive Board.25 The surveillance covers in particular the DOEs management responsibilities, 
resource and organisational management and technical and analytical review processes that are 
essential to deliver the intended services. Furthermore, the Executive Board is working with the 
elaboration of more specific standards for the performance of the DOEs. 
 
                                                
24 Section III. B. 6 Accreditation procedures. 
25 Section III. B. 5 do, see also 2007 EB-report paragraph 25 (b). 
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The accreditation period is three years after which, again for legitimacy reasons, a re-accreditation 
has to be applied for.26 The re-accreditation procedure takes into account the performance of DOEs 
over the previous period and serves to confirm their competence.  
 
For their part, the DOEs report directly to the Executive Board, and they serve generally as an 
interface between the project developers and the Executive Board. The DOEs do not represent 
project developer’s vis-à-vis the Executive Board. 
 
On the decentralised level, one also finds the Designated National Authorities (DNAs), which are 
the official CDM responsible bodies of the respective governments. The DNAs of project host 
countries have to voluntary approve the country’s participation, and the host country DNA is also 
confirming the contribution to sustainable development.27 Hence, the DNAs are also important for 
input legitimacy of the CDM governance system. However, in this paper it is the CDM governance 
system, and not the DNAs that are analysed. 
 
 
5. The legitimacy and efficiency of the CDM system 
In Section 4, a number of critical questions concerning the functioning of the CDM governance 
system (and the functioning herein of the Executive Board) were pointed out: 1)  Are the roles 
given to the Executive Board really optimising the legitimacy of the CDM system? Is there a lack of 
systematic enquiry as to which projects are accepted by the Executive Board? 3) Do the Executive 
Board’s decisions also depend on political considerations? The answers to these three critical 
questions are of significance to both the legitimacy and the efficiency of the CDM governance 
system. 
 
In this Section the three critical questions are answered in the following way: The first critical 
question is answered by analysing the institutional challenges of the Executive Board.  
 
The second critical question is answered by analysing the standardisation of methodologies as well 
as the standard-setting within the governance system. 
                                                
26 Section III. B. 7.  Accreditation procedures. 
27 Relevant but outside scope of study, cf. Ellis and Kamel (2007). 
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The third critical question is partly answered by the answer given to the second question above. 
Partly, the answer consist of introducing the classical procedure in order to avoid any suspicion 
about political considerations by introducing an appeal procedure, hence, this question is analysed 
at the end of this section.  
 
Infrastructural challenges 
The Executive Board (EB) has often reiterated that ‘EB members have to collectively provide the 
professional and regulatory competence needed to supervise the CDM which is a mechanism of 
substantial size, global spread and sectoral diversity. In addition, it is important to reiterate that 
members and alternate members need to invest a considerable amount of time to provide their 
professional service. Currently, EB responsibilities demand an average of four months per year, of 
which two months are just for attending EB meetings and related travel. Members who assume 
special roles and functions will need to invest much more time. The Board noted that presently 
there is no remuneration/compensation for this dedication of time by members.’28  
 
The Executive Board also noted that, ‘against the backdrop of the dynamic development of the 
CDM, it is important that the terms, mandates, nominations, selection process and tenure of 
members ensure membership of the Board to carry out the functions referred to above.’29  
 
The CMP in its guidance has encouraged constituencies to nominate members and alternate 
members who have the required qualifications and sufficient time to perform functions, as indicated 
in the Executive Board report, to serve on the Executive Board in order to ensure that the Executive 
Board has expertise in, inter alia, financial, environmental and clean development mechanism 
regulatory matters and executive decision making.30 
 
However, this guidance does not imply any changes of the framework conditions for the work of 
the Executive Board and Executive Board members. Again, the CMP has chosen the route of 
consolidation. Consequently, the CMP leaves it to the Executive Board to manage within the 
present framework by explicitly encouraging the Executive Board to improve and, where possible, 
                                                
28 E.g. 2007 EB-report paragraph 92. 
29 Do. paragraph 93. 
30 Decision  2/CMP3 paragraph 5. 
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simplify the operational aspects of the CDM and in general focus on major policy and system 
improvements.  
 
Regarding one practical aspect, however, the CMP has not come up with a new option. In its 
guidance it acknowledged the considerable workload for Executive Board members in between 
meetings and pointed in that context at the ‘effective use and expansion of the Executive Board 
support structure and provision of dedicated secretarial and information technology support to 
Executive Board members’. This means that the Executive Board is allowed through the MAP to 
provide for local support to members and alternates. Specific options were discussed at Executive 
Board 39 in May 2008.31 In the vocabulary of this paper, the implementation of this 
recommendation would increase the input legitimacy of the CDM governance system. 
 
Standardisation of methodologies 
In general, in order to increase legitimacy and efficiency of the CDM governance system, the 
Executive Board has continuously simplified and clarified various procedures adapting to lessons 
learned, experience gained and the development of the mechanism as such.  
 
Thus the Executive Board actively follows up on CMP encouragement to improve and where 
possible simplify the operational aspects of the CDM, as well as focus on major policy and system 
improvements in general. The Executive Board also follows up with frequent improvement of 
guidance and clarifications.32  
 
Turning to methodologies, the Executive Board has set up a system for deviations and revisions of 
monitoring plans, allowing flexibility of project administration.33  
 
The Executive Board has extended the grace period from 8 weeks to 8 months for the submission 
for validation in which old versions of revised methodologies can still be applied.  This extension is 
another example of flexibility in order to increase the efficiency of the CDM governance system. 
However, there are limits to the degree of flexibility of the system, as its legitimacy has to be 
                                                
31 See EB 37 report. 
32 See as examples 2007 EB-report, paragraphs 37, 74 and 83 on guidance to project developers.  
33 Do. paragraph 79. 
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safeguarded.34 In sum, as pointed out in Section 2 above, it appears that there is a trade-off between 
efficiency and legitimacy as far as flexibility of the CDM governance system is concerned.  
 
In addition, the methodology approval procedures have been streamlined considerably including 
increased possibilities of interaction with project developers before a recommendation is submitted 
to the Executive Board by the Methodologies Panel. The new procedures have led to general 
reductions of time taken to approve methodologies and, hence, lower transaction costs.35 
 
The CMP encourages the Executive Board to continue its efforts to broaden applicability of 
methodologies and further develop generic and user-friendly methodological tools that can assist 
PDs in designing or applying methodologies and promote simplicity and, thereby, the efficiency of 
the system. It also encouraged stakeholders to submit new proposals on how to demonstrate 
additionality for the Executive Board to consider and, hereby, lower transaction costs (cf. 
Williamson 1985).36  
 
The Executive Board has contributed to standardisation of the efficiency of the CDM governance 
system by consolidating seven approved methodologies into three consolidated methodologies 
broadening their application, while – in its own words - maintaining their environmental integrity 
and applicability conditions as in the underlying approved methodologies. The consolidated 
methodology for grid-connected electricity generation from renewable sources (ACM0002) covers 
technologies or measures such as solar, hydro, tidal, wave, wind and geothermal, which makes it the 
most widely applied methodology used in 40 % of all projects registered. 
 
The additionality tool is of particular interest in order to increase efficiency through reduced 
transaction costs since additionality is the cornerstone of the CDM concept and since the calculation 
of baseline emissions are basically counterfactual. The Executive Board has also considered a 
revision along with guidance on investment analysis. The Executive Board considers it important 
that the data used are objectively sourced and calculations can be replicated.37 
 
                                                
34 Do. paragraph 39. 
35 Do. paragraph 40. 
36 Decision 2/CMP3, paragraph 18, cf. footnote 12. 
37 Report EB 37 para. 2 and EB 38 para. 
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Standard-setting within the governance system  
The CMP wish for consolidation is to be seen on a background where a relatively large number of 
projects are not automatically registered or credits are not automatically issued. This has revealed 
discrepancies between the perceptions of quality requirements of on the one hand the Executive 
Board, and, on the other hand, the DOEs having validated and verified the cases in their role as 
decentralised parts of the governance system. The signal is that the CMP wants these discrepancies 
to be solved through the existing design of the system.  
 
Measurability and additionality are core elements of the legitimacy of the CDM governance system. 
However, they are not static but develop over time as experience is gained. The Executive Board 
seems to have tried to ensure that registered projects meet the appropriate level of environmental 
integrity, i.e. the output legitimacy of the CDM governance system. This might sometimes be at the 
cost of the system’s efficiency due to the trade-off that is sometimes found between efficiency and 
legitimacy (cf. Section 2 above). In short, the way forward is not to repeat past imperfections but to 
set common standards for the expected performance from in particular the DOEs. 
 
A vital step has been the newly published CDM Validation and Verification Manual (VVM) as a 
standard for DOE’s work. An input to this manual was the identification and communication of key 
issues resulting in requests for review. Various Executive Board  meetings identified particular 
issues in relation to investment analysis, substantiation of barriers, applicability of small-scale 
methodologies, completeness of monitoring plans and lack of clarity on the validation conducted.38   
 
The CMP has also requested the Executive Board to continue ongoing efforts to further improve the 
substantiation of its decisions and increase the understanding of the underlying rationale by users.39 
This can be interpreted as a request for increased input legitimacy of the CDM governance system 
(cf. Easton 1965). Further improvement has to target the needs of DOEs and project participants, 
which might suggest that DOEs are formally included in the further systemic development as they 
have been in the development of the coming VVM.40 Equally, regular dialogue with the project 
developers could improve common understanding and development of legitimacy and efficiency 
requirements of the CDM.  
                                                
38 EB 36 report, paragraph 74. ( http://cdm.unfccc.int/EB/036/eb36rep.pdf ). 
39 Do. paragraph 15 (e). 
40 Interview with Flavio Gomes BV and current DOE Forum chair. 
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During the traditional interaction with stakeholders at Executive Board meetings, DOE 
representatives has stressed the need for further dialogue between the Executive Board and the 
DOEs both being part of the regulatory system and enhanced interaction on issues regarding i.e. 
registration requirements.41 
 
Appeal procedure 
As in most governance systems, an important factor of the legitimacy of the CDM governance 
system is whether or not there is a transparent appeal procedure. The Executive Board’s decisions 
on registration or issuance are final in the sense that a new decision can only be taken on the basis 
of resubmission. An appeal procedure, arbitration or an ombudsman system is not foreseen by the 
M&Ps. 
 
IETA has pointed to the fact that the CDM system do not have an appeal procedure compared to 
‘other regulatory markets that have appeal procedures, which allow both the regulator and the 
regulated party to challenge rulings and interpretations. Depending on the scale of the regulated 
market these particular appeal processes use national or international court procedures and/or an 
independent Ombudsman. …IETA welcomes the introduction of a wider reaching appeals process 
and it encourages the Parties to request the Executive Board to appoint an Ombudsman. The 
Ombudsman should be made responsible for overseeing and addressing challenges to 
decisions/interpretations made by the EB and its Bodies. A detailed and clear framework would 
need to be developed to dictate the circumstances under which an appeal may be launched and the 
process to be followed until a binding decision is made.’42 In the vocabulary of this paper, the 
introduction of an appeal process or ombudsman would first and foremost increase the legitimacy of 
the CDM governance system. 
 
Generally, it might be argued, that a successful implementation of initiatives as referred to in 
previous sections enhancing substantiation of decisions, communication and top down 
standardisation in the form of methodology tools might reduce the need currently expressed for 
some appeal procedures. However, this is not an argument against such procedures. It does not 
change the role of the Executive Board being able to exercise at the same time a legislative, 
                                                
41 Cf. Webcast from EB 37. 
42 Such proposals were also presented i.e. at side events during COP 13/CMP 3 in Bali December 2007. 
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executive and quasi-judiciary power. As such, it does not add to the legal rights of the project 
developers. In short, clearer division of power in the CDM system is necessary to increase its 
legitimacy. 
 
Normally, an Ombudsman is an official, usually (but not always) appointed by the government or 
by parliament, who is charged with representing the interests of the public by investigating and 
addressing complaints reported by individual citizens.43 Introducing an Ombudsman has the 
disadvantage that his or her findings typically are non-binding recommendations. Consequently, the 
Executive Board could choose not to follow a recommendation to revisit its decisions. Therefore, it 
is questionable whether such a model would actually increase the legitimacy of the CDM 
governance system. 
 
On the other hand, introducing an independent appeal body and a formal appeal procedure on top of 
the present system with review procedures could increase inefficiency, adding an extra layer to that 
system and, thereby, adding further transaction costs to the CDM governance system. In all 
circumstances, the increased inefficiency has to be judged against the possible increase of the 
legitimacy of the system. 
 
A simpler – and potentially less inefficiency increasing - model could be an appeal procedure 
covering procedural matters only.  Such an appeal procedure is envisaged according to the 
procedures for accreditation in cases where the Accreditation Panel on the basis of a spot check 
recommends that a DOE be suspended.44 However, such a model might not be satisfactory for PDs 
contesting the substance of Executive Board decisions on registration or issuance. 
 
Alternatively an arbitration procedure could be set up with representatives of the Executive Board, 
the PDs, and DOEs, and possibly some independent persons (with legal backgrounds). In such a 
model, the Executive Board representative would have to judge the justification of his or her own 
decision in the Executive Board and the project developers, and DOEs would equally tend to defend 
their original positions. This model, as a consequence, does not seem to be legitimate. 
 
                                                
43 See, for example, the homepage of the world’s first ombudsman institution: www.ombudsmanden.dk  
44 Procedure for accrediting operational entities, version 8, annex II (http://cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/cdm_accr_01.pdf) 
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In conclusion, the most feasible way to increase legitimacy without at the same time increasing 
transaction costs would be to substitute the review process with an appeal procedure allowing PDs, 
DOEs, Parties involved and other stakeholders particularly affected, as well as the Executive Board 
to bring a DOE validation or verification before an independent appeal body. If there is no reaction, 
i.e. no appeal is launched; the DOE validation or verification will be final which corresponds to the 
present M&Ps. 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the legitimacy and efficiency aspects of the CDM governance 
system. 
 
The primary concern of a legitimate and efficient CDM governance system is to ensure relevant 
motivation for the private sector in terms of consistency, predictability and profitability and at the 
same time guarantee environmental credibility. Clear standards and a clear definition of private 
sector rights as participants’ rights can promote both sets of motivation. This is what characterises a 
legitimate and efficient CDM governance system. 
 
As outlined in previous sections of this paper, the CMP at this stage is aimed at consolidating the 
present system and requesting the Executive Board to enhance rules and procedures as appropriate 
in order to ensure the objectives of the mechanism.  
 
The CDM is unique in the sense that its subject is unique. In terms of governance, however, it 
provides the same kind of output as other regulatory systems. The CDM governance system 
monopolises legal, executive and quasi judiciary functions in one and the same body impacting 
incentives for the private stakeholders to participate in the system without necessarily guaranteeing 
better environmental integrity than through a clearer division of functions. 
 
CDM transaction costs will never be eliminated entirely because the key commodity – CERs – is 
unusual and requires careful monitoring, verification, and evaluation before anyone would pay for 
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it. Unlike crude oil, copper, or grain, a CER represents the absence of a quantity of invisible GHG 
in the atmosphere relative to a theoretical baseline of a project that was, in many cases, not 
undertaken to begin with. A CER does not have the concrete reality check of an exchange for 
physical delivery, since it is impossible to deliver an ‘absence’ to a specific holder. If people and 
governments are expected to pay for CERs, there must be procedures and checks to prevent the 
many ways one could create meaningless CERs. However, these procedures necessarily create 
transaction costs. Nevertheless, the transaction costs could and should be reduced in order for the 
CDM governance system to become an efficient governance system. Therefore, the Executive 
Board must have efficient means of enforcement and assurances vis-à-vis the DOEs and DNAs. 
 
Critical questions can be and has been asked vis-a-vis the legitimacy and efficiency of the roles 
played by the Executive Board within the CDM governance system. These questions has been 
operationalised to cover institutional challenges, standardisation of methodologies, standard-setting 
within the governance system and the (lack of) an appeal procedure. I all cases, it has been shown 
that the CDM governance system is able to tackle the legitimacy and efficiency dilemmas. Hence, 
the paper has demonstrated that – at least in the case analysed in this paper – the experiment in 
international governance without the strong support of states can be relatively successful. Perhaps 
we tend to overestimate the necessary strong role of states in international governance. 
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